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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEGER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-VS- ,.'..-.; ..- . 
ROBERTS, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
;,.,- - v s ~ ; '•  ,.:r 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Added. 
Case No. 13737 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
, NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action, in the sum of $2,782.00 was commenced 
on October 2, 1972, by plaintiff, a corporate general contrac-
tor, to establish its right to liquidated damages against the 
defendant subcontractor because of the defendant's failure to 
proceed promptly, in a good, workmanlike manner, and to com-
plete a contract for the plumbing and mechanical construction 
work on two (2) State of Utah Road Maintenance Stations referred 
to as road sheds, one located at Salt Lake City, Utah, and one 
at Manila, Utah. The defendant denied these allegations and 
filed a cross claim and counterclaim, alleging as a first claim 
that the plaintiff and its surety upon said projects owned defen-
- 2 - « 
14-1-5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended; and as a second claim, that I 
plaintiff only owed defendant the sum of $3,249*77 for several ^ 
other unrelated transactions. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a plenary trial, the court filed a memorandum 
decision, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a joint and 
several judgment against the plaintiff and its surety, on defen-
dant's cross claim and counterclaim in the sum of $8,494.95 on 
its first claim, and against plaintiff in the sum of $782.25 
upon the second claim. Motions to amend the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment were made by all parties. 
The Court denied the motion of plaintiff and its surety, granted 
the defendant's motion to amend, and awarded to the defendant 
attorney's fees of $2,607.50 against the plaintiff and its surety 
on the defendant's first claim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and plaintiff for and on behalf of its 
surety asks for a reversal of certain findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, for reversal of the joint and several judgments 
against plaintiff and its surety, for reversal of the award 
against plaintiff and its surety of attorney's fees, or in the 
alternative, for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, hereinafter referred to as Roberts, 
submitted a bid to the plaintiff (Ex. 2-P) which was accepted 
by the plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as Leger, to do the 1 
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mechanical and plumbing work as described in the plans 
(Ex. 3-P) and specifications (Ex. 22-P) on maintenance 
stations at 1950 South Fourth West, Salt Lake City, and at 
Manila, Utah. The bid contained the following material 
provisions: 
(a) In performance of this work, time is of the 
essence and I agree to actually move on to the job, 
with all necessary tools, supplies and equipment, 
within two (2) working days after receiving written 
or oral notice and to start and carry on the work 
uninterruptedly to completion of the stage directed 
by the general contractor. 
\ (h) I agree to replace any defective workman-
ship or materials which occur within one (1) year 
from date of completion at no cost to the general 
contractor or the owner. 
(j) Quality of all materials and/or work fur-
nished must be as specified. All materials will 
be subject to inspection and approval after delivery. 
If materials are rejected, they will be disposed 
of at no cost to the general contractor or owner. 
(p) The work shall be commenced upon written 
or oral order to proceed and completed within the 
time stated in this bid. If the work is not com-
pleted in accordance with the foregoing, it is under-
stood that the general contractor will suffer damage 
and it being impractical and unfeasible to determine 
the amount of actual damage, it is agreed that i: 
will pay, on demand, to the general contractor,as 
fixed and liquidated damages and not as penalty, 
the sum of $50.00 for each calendar day of delay 
until the work is completed and accepted. Extension 
of time shall be granted, when asked for in writing, 
when it is, in the judgment of the general contrac-
tor, not practical or impossible or because of 
unforeseeable causes beyond control and without 
fault or negligence on my behalf to complete said 
work in the specified time. (Above causes including 
but not restricted to strikes, war, acts of God, 
acts of the Government, acts of the owner, acts of 
another contractor in the performance of a contract 
with the owner, and adverse weather conditions.) 
I recognize the general contractor has a com-
pletion gate guarantee in his contract with the 
owner that calls for completion on or before Novem-
ber 30, 1971. 
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In addition to the liquidated damages, I agree 
to pay the general contractor an amount equal to 
his cost in maintaining a field office and super-
vision over the work for each day beyond the speci-
fied completion date if it is determined that I 
caused this delay, because: I recognize and agree 
that the general contractor's costs are directly 
proportional to the length of the construction 
period, and therefore shall reimburse the general 
contractor for all days beyond the specified com-
pletion date, whether an extension of time is 
granted or not. (Emphasis added) 
Leger's employees*commenced work on the Salt Lake Road 
Shed on August 1, 1971, (Tr. 1st day, p. 9, 1.26). Roberts' 
employees were working on the same job on August 4, 1971, (Ex. 
17-P under date of August 4, 1971). Further, Roberts was 
aware before August 1, 1971, that Leger intended to begin the 
job and had ordered the pipe needed for the job by August 1, 
1971,. (TR. 2nd day, p. 112, 1. 17-23). The contractual obli-
gations which Roberts had to Leger were as follows, (Tr. 1st 
day, p. 15): 
1. Installation of underground piping for 
sewer and other utilities. 
2. Welding and fabrication of radiant heating 
pipe gridwork, also referred to as pads, covering 
the floor of the building garage area consisting 
of eight (8) bays in Salt Lake City and four (4) 
bays at Manila, Utah, but which did not cover the 
office area in either place. 
3. Installation of plumbing and fixtures in 
office area. 
4. Installation of boiler and pumps. 
5. Installation of septic tanks. 
6. Installation of the water line and gas line. 
The installation of the radiant heating pads was a 
major portion of Roberts' contractual obligations. The mater-
ials and installation occupied the entire interior of both 
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buildings except for the office portion, thereby preventing 
the pouring of concrete floors over the pads and all other 
inside work requiring scaffolding on the interior of the 
building, (Tr. 1st day, p. 10, L. 10). 
The welding and fabrication of the heating pads was 
performed by Dartnell Welding, a subcontractor of Roberts, 
(Tr. 2nd day, p. 126). Roberts was informed that the Salt 
Lake project was ready for the heating pads to be installed 
on August 27, 1971, (Tr. 1st day, p. 10, 1. 21 to p. 11, L. 12) 
and the Manila project, on September 4, 1971, (Tr. 1st day, 
p. 50) . . Roberts was aware of the progress of the job, and 
was required by the contract to move on the job within two (2) 
days after being requested to do so. Yet he failed to begin 
on the heating pads at Salt Lake City until October 8, 1971, 
and at Manila, until September 14, 1971. When asked about this 
problem by the court, Roberts replied that the header part of 
the pad for Manila was being fabricated in Dartnellfs shop, 
(Tr. 2nd day, p. 126), yet Roberts offered no explanation as 
to why fabrication in the shop wasn't completed by Dartnell 
so that work at the jobsite could proceed two (2) days after 
August 27, 1971 at Salt Lake City, and two (2) days after 
September 4, 1971 at Manila. Moreover, the defendant failed 
to call any witnesses from its own subcontractor, Dartnell, 
who performed the welding to explain the reason for the delay. 
The work of fabricating, welding, and testing the 
heating pads at the Salt Lake Shed should have taken three 
(3) to four (4) weeks, according to Lou Leger, president of 
plaintiff, (Tr. 1st day, p. 12, L. 7), or two and one-half 
( l \ ? \ 4-r\ 4 - T A - V ^ ^ f ^ \ T . T ^ / ^ V ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ v . ^ n M r / +-•-> r m ^ ^ ^ - . r . "T* -> 4- 4- ^  ^ <-* /~vv^  TT4-^T^ 
I 
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State Building Board Inspector, who appeared for the defen- I 
dant, (Tr. 2nd day, p. 45. L. 17-25). No other competent fl 
testimony was introduced to show how long this portion of j 
Roberts' work should have taken. The last welding on the 
Salt Lake City job was done on October 28, 1971. It was tested 
for the first time on November 11, 1971, (Tr. 2nd day, p. 115, 
L. 2-16). The heating pads on the Salt Lake City job could 
not be approved until December 7, 1971 because they would 
not hold 150 pounds of pressure, as required by the specifi-
cations, (Ex. 48-P, report sheet December 7, 1971, Ex. 22-P 
Section 18B, Heating and Ventilation, paragraph 3 ) . 
When Roberts was asked why no work was done after 
October 28, 1971, Roberts said that storm had caused some 
difficulty in pinning down where air was escaping from the 
lines, and that was why it took so long after the 28th of 
October, (Tr. 2nd day, pp. 127-128). On the other hand, 
Roberts1 own records, (Ex. 17-P) show that the last welding 
on the Salt Lake Road Shed (designated in his records as 
SLRS or RS) was performed on October 27, 1971. The same 
exhibit also records that no further work of any sort was done 
on SLRS until November 10, 11 and 12, 1971, and not again 
until November 23, 29 and 30, and December 1, 2, and 4, 1971. 
For the month of November, then, Roberts1 own records show 
that out of twenty-two (22) working days, excluding Saturdays, 
Sundays and holidays, his employees were on the SLRS job only 
six (6) days. The construction records of the Utah State 
Building Board (Ex. 48-P) show approximately the same date 
of work. Rain is noted by these records only on November 29, 
1971. 
i 
4 
I 
1 
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The first pressure test in Exhibit 48-P is shown as 
occurring on November 24, 1971. As of that date, the system 
was leaking about one (1) pound of air pressure per hour. 
Location of leaks in welds was noted on November 29, 1971. 
The pad was still leaking on December 1, 1971. No work by 
Roberts ' men is recorded again in Exhibit 48-P until December 
6, 1971, when pressure was put on the pad. On December 7, 
1971, the pressure was noted as being about 160 pounds. 
Roberts testified there was "a lot of rain," while 
the weather records (Ex. 46-P) for the period of October 27th 
show rain on October 27, 29, 30 (Saturday), 31 (Sunday), Novem-
ber 12 (from 5:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight), November 13 (Satur-
day), and November 14 (Sunday), November 15 (from 12:00 mid-
night to 7:00 a.m.), November 16 (10:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight), 
November 26 (4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), November 27 (from 3:00 
a.m. to 7:00 a.m., and from 4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.)(Saturday). 
These same records show that if Roberts had commenced work on 
the heating pads within two (2) days after August 27th, he 
• • • ' • • • - ' • • ' \ • • \ . . . . ^ 
would have encountered virtually no precipitation nor inclement 
weather during regular working time,(month of September, Ex. 
46-P). Contrary to Roberts' complaints about inclement wea-
ther, no extension of time for any reason was requested by 
Roberts nor give by Leger (R. p. 36-37, Finding No. 32). 
Further, the plans and specifications called for the 
following items to be furnished by Roberts (Ex. 22-P), Sections 
18A-05: 
3. Lubricated plug valves equal to Nordstrom 
' 'or Walworth.... 
• Workmanship.... ,
 f .. 
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1. Run lines as indicated on plans and connect up 
to gas main or to supply tank furnished by owner. 
and at Section 18B-11 of Exhibit 22~P: 
Boiler Flue and Breaching.... 
2. Shall be constructed with a stainless steel 
line and a galvanized steel casing separated from 
liner by spacers. 
i 
There is no dispute that the defendant failed and 
refused to properly accomplish the foregoing requirements of 
the specifications. Larry Roberts, president of Roberts Cor-
poration, Inc., the defendant, acknowledged that the lubricated 
plug valve he installed at Manila did not have a lubrication 
fitting on it, admitted that he refused to replace it, (Tr. 2nd 
day, pp* 105 and 106), and refused to do anything further about 
the aluminum stack on the boiler at Manila other than to write 
his subcontractor a letter of demand, (Tr. 2nd day, p. 80, 
L. 26). Roberts, through its president, Larry Roberts, refused 
to install the gas line at the Salt Lake City job to a gas main, 
although Leger and the Utah State Building Board requested that 
Roberts do the work, (Tr. 1st day, pp. 18-19). 
Both the furnace at Manila and the furnace at Salt 
Lake City, which were also Roberts1 responsibility, never opera-
ted properly (Tr. 1st day, pp. 41 and 42). As a result, Leger 
was required to hire a boiler repairman to resolve the problem, 
despite repeated requests to Roberts to provide the remedy 
himself (Tr. 1st day, pp. 41 and 42). 
Roberts repeatedly ignored these items even though 
they were shown on the punch lists from the Utah State Building 
Board (Ex. 4-P, 5-P, 6-P and 7-P). He also repeatedly refused 
to correct these items (Tr. 1st day, pp. 22-25). This 
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resulted in the sum of $11,330.42 being held up from the State 
of Utah until February 26, 1973, some five (5) months after 
the filing of the instant action by the plaintiff, (Tr. 1st 
day, p. 44, L. 22,; Tr. 2nd day, p. 12, L. 6-10; Ex. 21-P). 
Despite the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court 
.» 
failed to make any finding that Roberts1 sole remedy in accor-
dance with his contract was to apply in writing to Leger, and 
made the following findings of fact which are erroneous: (R. 37-40) 
34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49. Furthermore, 
after finding that Roberts was not entitled to attorney's fees, 
the trial court granted a motion to amend the findings and 
judgment to award attorney's fees, which Leger and its surety 
also claim is error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO 
FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME IN THE EVENT OF DELAY WAS 
TO MAKE WRITTEN APPLICATION TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The accepted bid of the defendant (Ex. 2-P) contained 
the following language: (Emphasis added) 
I will pay, on demand, to the general contrac-
tor, as fixed and liquated damages and not as penalty, 
the sum of $50.00 for each calendar day of delay until 
the work is completed and accepted. Extension of time 
shall be granted, when asked for in writing, when it 
is, in the judgment of the general contractor, not 
-. practical or impossible or because of unforeseeable 
causes beyond control and without fault or negligence 
on my behalf to complete said work in the specified time. 
There is no question that Roberts never asked for 
any extension of time in writing; nor did Leger give Roberts 
any extension of time in which to complete and obtain accept-
- 10 -
A clause similar to the above is seen in Russell vs. 
Bothwell & Swaner Co., 57 Utah 362, 194 P. 1109 (1920), wherein 
the plaintiff entered into a contract with a contractor, one of 
the co-defendants, to furnish carpentry work for the erection 
of a dwelling for another co-defendant, A mechanic's lien was 
filed by the plaintiff and suit was filed for a sum claimed due 
plaintiff. 
... •
:
'-. The contract between the plaintiff and the general 
contractor, who was referred to as "owner11, provided in part 
as follows: -'•' 
Should the contractor be delayed in the comple-
tion or presecution of the work by the act, neglect, or 
" ' default of the owner or by any damage caused by fire or 
other casualty for which the contractor is not responsible, 
or by general strike or lockout caused by act of employes 
and beyond the control of the contractor, then the time 
herein specified for the completion of the work may be 
extended for a period equivalent to the time lost by rea-
son of any or all the causes aforesaid, provided a claim 
for such allowance is determined by agreement in writing 
of the parties hereto. 
The plaintiff subcontractor never applied for an exten 
sion of time in writing. However, the trial court made findings 
of fact that the contractor defendant delayed the plaintifffs 
carpentry work by failing and refusing to furnish materials, and 
awarded the plaintiff damages for this loss of time. The Utah 
Supreme Court, after noting that there was no evidence that the 
delay was the result of fraudulent, malicious, capricious, or 
unreasonable acts on the part of the contractor, cited the case 
of Goss vs. Northern Pacific Hospital Assn., 50 Wash. 238, 96 
P. 1079, which case said: 
but where the probability of the happening 
of the condition has been foreseen, and a remedy is pro-
vided for its happening, the presumption is that the 
garties intended the prescribed remedy as the sole^remedy 
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where there is nothing in the contract itself or in 
the conditions surrounding its execution that necessi-
tates a different conclusion. 
Accordingly, the award for damages for delay made to 
the plaintiff by the trial court was reversed. See also 
Western Engineers Inc. vs. State, 20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216 
(1968) . 
The reasons given by Roberts for its delay in the 
instant case were adverse weather conditions and defective 
valves, which are discussed infra. No extension of time was 
requested by Roberts orally or in writing for delay from any 
cause, nor was excuse an issue until the case was tried. This 
being the defendant's sole remedy in the event of delay, the 
court should not have accepted Roberts! reasons for delay as 
excusing its requirements under the contract. A finding of 
fact should have been made by the court that this remedy was 
the sole and exclusive remedy of Roberts if it claimed that 
its delay was excused. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN MAKING FINDINGS 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS MAKING A CLAIM FOR 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ONLY FOR THE DELAY ROBERTS 
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR IN LAYING THE RADIANT 
HEATING PADS IN THE MANILA AND SALT LAKE ROAD 
SHEDS. 
Finding of fact No. 34 provides: 
Lou Leger, president of the plaintiff corpora-
tion, testified that it was claiming liquidated damages 
only for the delay Roberts was responsible for in laying 
the radiant heating pads in the Manila and Salt Lake 
Road Sheds, it being plaintiff, Leger Construstion Com-
pany's contention that defendant was slow in starting, 
laying and finding leaks in said radiant heating pads, 
thus delaying pouring of cement floors. 
Finding of- fact No. 42 provides as follows: 
12 -
alleged delay in starting and completing installation j 
of radiant heating pads. 
Leger's testimony regarding these findings is found in 
the first day of the Transcript starting at page 67, line 25: 
Q Now, he (Roberts) had some work to do in the 
office area, didnft he, so far as toilet facilities go? 
A Yes. > -• .- ' 
Q And that can't be done until after the framing 
is up, can it? 
A No. 
Q And the framing is your responsibility? 
A Yes, 
Q He couldn't finish that office portion until 
the sheetrock was up, could he? 
t . A -No. 
Q Do you know when the sheetrock went on? 
A I don't have that record here. 
Q It had to go on after the framing, doesn't it? 
A Yes. . ;. " 
THE COURT: Is it your claim the delay is based 
solely upon the heating pad? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, ^ : 
(Emphasis added) 
The question interposed by the court did not ask Leger 
if the claim of the corporation for liquidated damages is based 
solely upon the delay with respect to the heating pads. Leger 
was being asked questions at that time which related to possible 
delay by either Leger or Roberts in the office area of the build-
ing. The office area of the building did not have the heating 
pads in the floor- At that time the trial court interposed only 
one question at line 10, page 68, of the Transcript, in which 
t 
i 
4 
1 
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the court referred to the delay on the heating pads only. It 
is obvious, in the context that the question was asked, that 
Leger's answer intended to convey to the court that the delay 
in construction about which he was being questioned at that 
time was not due to any failure of Roberts to install toilet 
fixtures in the office area, as he was being queried about in 
the immediately preceding questions, but was solely due to 
installation of the heating pad. ;; 
In the first day of the Transcript at page 82, line 
24, the same basic sequence of questions is seen relative to 
the Manila job: 
Q They (Leger's men) poured the slabs in 
October? 
in? 
A Yes. 
Q What about the framing, when did that go 
A I don't know. 
Q The framing had to go in before Roberts 
could put their pipes in the walls, right? 
A Yes. 
Q And the sheetrock went on after that? 
A Yes. 
Q You have to have an inspection before the 
dry-wall goes on, don't you? 
A No. 
Q Tell me if I am saying this correctly, 
The total to be alleged attributed to Roberts at the 
Manila job resulted only from the laying of the pad; 
is that right? 
A Yes. 
(Emphasis added) 
The last question is incapable of any definition/ 
There is no subject of the sentence. Counsel simplv said. 
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"The total to be alleged to be attributed,. ..." Nothing more was 
said by counsel as to what he meant by the use of the wor.d "total. 
Any answer to such a question is meaningless, as the question 
itself does not specify what is being asked. No other questions 
were asked to clarify what was meant, and none of the questions 
preceding that question use any word to fill in the meaning as' 
to what was meant by "total." In any event, the question was 
pertinent only to the Manila Job. / 
In both of these underlined questions and answers, 
no mention is made of the plaintiff corporation's claim for 
liquidated damages, nor is Leger asked if that was the extent 
of the entire claim of the corporate plaintiff. Further, there 
is no mention made in these questions of Roberts' refusal to 
install the gas line, (Tr. 1st day, pp. 18 and 19), nor a stain-
less steel stack at Salt Lake (Tr. 1st day, p. 20), and the items 
on the punch lists (Ex. 4-P, 5-P, 6-P, 7~P), nor in particular, 
the lubricated plug valve at Manila, which resulted in the State 
of Utah's refusing to pay Leger until Leger finished Roberts1 
work. To base a finding that the plaintiff corporation was 
limiting its entire claim upon both road sheds solely upon Leger's 
answer to the above two questions as to delay on the heating pads 
as opposed to delay in installing the office toilet fixture, is 
to allow both the court and counsel to take advantage of tricking 
a witness into saying something he obviously did not mean, and, 
as a matter of fact, did not say, in the context of the record. 
A finding of the trial court must be based on compe-
tent evidence that supports the findings. Johnson vs. Hughes, 
120 Utah 50, 232 P. 2d 362 (1951). No competent evidence was 
^f^A^nn^ fn QV>™A7 fhpf T.^ cr^ -r• <=• norDoration intended to limit 
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its claim for liquidated damages to delay caused by Roberts in 
the fabrication, welding and testing of the heating pads; thus, 
this finding of the trial court must be reversed. 
POINT III. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO MAKE ITS 
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMENCED WORK -. ' 
ON THE RADIANT HEATING PADS AT SALT LAKE 
CITY WITHOUT ALSO MAKING A FINDING AS TO 
THE DATE ROBERTS WAS REQUESTED TO DO SUCH 
WORK. . 
• Finding No. 36 states that Roberts1 installation of 
the radiant heating pads at the Salt Lake Road Shed was com-
menced on October 8, 1971; yet it is silent as to when Roberts 
was requested to do the work. The record shows without dispute 
that Roberts was told by Leger to commence this work on August 
27, 1971. Roberts offered no reason for the delay until 
October 8th, a period of 42 days, until he was asked about it 
by the court. At that time, his sole excuse for such a delay 
was that he was still fabricating the panels in the shop. 
However, no reason or excuse was offered by Roberts as to why 
the fabrication in the shop was not commenced prior to August 
27th so that the materials for installation would be available 
for on-site installation when the site was ready for these 
pads, nor why the work could not have been carried out unin-
terruptedly in accordance with Paragraph a. of defendant's 
contract if he had commenced the fabrication on time. The 
failure of the court to award damages in accordance with this 
admitted delay, a period of 43 days, or one third of the work 
period of a contract which was commenced on August 1st and was 
to be completed by November 30th, a total of 122 days, was 
error because the facts showing this part of the delay by 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING ANY 
WEIGHT TO TIME CONSUMED IN CONSTRUCTING 
A ROAD SHED IN LEHI BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE 
WAS INCOMPETENT TO SHOW WHAT A REASONABLE 
TIME IN CONSTRUCTING THE HEATING PADS IN 
SALT LAKE AND MANILA, UTAH WOULD BE. 
€ 
I 
I 
Finding No. 39 states that no greater progress was made 
on a road shed construction by Leger at Lehi than at the Manila 
and Salt Lake Road Sheds. This was based upon testimony on cross 
examination by Leger that the Lehi installation of radiant heating 
pads took about the same amount of time as the Manila and Salt 
Lake City jobs. This particular finding is irrelevant and incom- I 
petent to show that Roberts did not delay the Salt Lake and 
Manila jobs because there was no showing that the mechanical I 
contractor on the Lehi job did that project in a workmanlike ^j 
manner. All that it shows is that another subcontractor may 
have breached its contract with Leger, and is irrelevant and I 
immaterial to the case involving Roberts and Leger. 
POINT V. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT | 
INCLEMENT WEATHER IN ANY WAY MADE WELDING 
ON THE SALT LAKE ROAD SHED DIFFICULT. . . 
The hourly precipitation section of the weather reports ' 
for September 1971 (Ex. 46-P) shows that during the month of I 
September, 1971, when the defendant should have been working on 
the heating pads for the Salt Lake Road Shed, but was not, pre- * | 
cipitation fell during working hours only five days out of the . 
total of thirty (30) days with only one (1) day showing more than ' 
one-hundredths (1/100) of an inch of precipitation. On the other ^ 
hand, during October, 1971, when the defendant actually started 
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work on the heating pads, Exhibit 47-P shows precipitation 
during working hours for eight (8) days, and out of these 
eight (8) days, the 16th, 17th, 24th, and 31st were week-
ends during which time Roberts had no men on any job. Thus, 
finding of fact No. 31 (R. 39) is in error. The only testimony 
to support this finding was the testimony of Thomas Patterson, 
and he admitted that he didn't know how often or how much rain 
fell during this period-of time (Tr. 2nd day, p. 44). There-
fore, Patterson's testimony was not competent to establish 
that the weather hampered Roberts. On the other hand, the 
weather reports show clearly that Roberts encountered preci-
pitation during working hours for only four (4) days out of 
twenty-one (21) working days during the entire thirty-one (31) 
days of October, 1971. 
POINT VI. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY ; 
CAUSED BY FAULTY VALVES FURNISHED BY IT. 
Finding No. 46 (R. 13) is as follows: 
The main problem in completing the radiant 
heating pad on the Salt Lake Road Shed was leaks which 
were ultimately found to be in several control valves 
furnished by a supplier to Roberts and which were as 
specified in the plans and specifications. 
Section 18B of Exhibit 22-P provides the specifications for 
the heating and ventilating system and Subdivision 18B-06 of 
this exhibit governs the specifications as to valves and pro-
vides: 
Valves, strainers and items listed below 
are specified with Crane....numbers. Walworth, Nibco, 
R. P. & C. will be acceptable. 
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Thereafter, the valves required are listed by their 
various Crane numbers. Nowhere in the specifications is the 
brand name, "Jenkins,11 mentioned or specified. Roberts testi-
fied that the valves he installed which leaked were Jenkins 
ball valves of a 125-pound rating, (Tr. 2nd day, p. 75) an 
obvious deviation from the specifications, as Exhibit 22 pro- * 
vides at Section 18B, Paragraph 3, first sentence , that the 
system shall prove tight under pressure of 150 p.s.i.g. 
Under Section 18 of Exhibit 22-P, it is provided as 
follows: .. • 
G. Materials: 
3'. If a contractor receives approval to use 
other than first named items, he shall be held respon-
sible to meet specified capacities, and must check space 
and openings available to be certain any alternate equip-
ment will fit the job site and conditions. In the event 
other than first named equipment is used and it will 
not fit the job site conditions, this contractor assumes 
responsibility for replacement with items first named 
in the specifications. (Emphasis added) 
It is apparent that the reason for leakage of the 
valves was that they were not as required by the specifications 
therefore a breach of the contract Roberts signed with Leger. 
Even if the valves provided by Roberts were in accor-
dance with the specifications, but were defective, there is 
nothing in the contract of the defendant, (Ex. 1) or the speci-
fications, (Ex. 22-P) which makes such a fact an excuse for 
delay of performance. The furnishing of defective material 
under a contract to furnish that material is not found in any 
treatise or cases as an excuse for delay in performance. 
Section 13, Am. Jur. 2d 58; Section 54, 17 Am. Jur 2d, Section 
387, 388; also, 17 Am. Jur. 2d 400 et seq. 
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POINT VII. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO, IN EFFECT, 
REQUIRE LEGER TO PROVE, BY A PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE, FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE 
PART OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Finding No. 44 provides: 
Leger did not establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the failure to complete the work 
within the time specified at the Salt Lake Road Shed 
on the radiant heating pad was due to the fault or 
negligence of the defendant. 
Such a finding has the effect of converting a breach 
of contract action for failure to perform, to a claim by Leger 
against Roberts for negligence which was neither pleaded nor 
intended to be proved. It is hornbook law that it is not 
necessary to prove negligence or fault in a contract action. 
II Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed. 2, Section 1290: 
As a contract consists of a binding promise 
or set of promises, a breach of contract is a failure, 
without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms 
the whole or any part of a contract. 
It is apparent that the trial court completely mis-
construed one provision of Exhibit 2-P: 
(p)....Extension of time shall be granted, 
when asked for in writing, when it is, in the judg-
ment of the general contractor, not practical or 
impossible or because of unforseeable causes beyond 
control and without fault or negligence on my behalf 
to complete said work in the specified time. 
(Emphasis added) 
The clause referring to fault or negligence is used 
only in conjunction with the judgment of the contractor in 
response to a written request by Roberts for an extension of 
time, which request was never made by Roberts. However/ • 
Leger, the contractor, was never given the opportunity to use 
his judgment as to whether Roberts1 delay was because of the 
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various causes listed and without fault or negligence on the part 
of Roberts., Since neither party invoked the clause, it has no 
efficacy. Even if the clause were to have any effect, Roberts 
would be the party having the burden of proving the affirmative 
defense of excuse by a preponderance of the evidence. 
. . . . , . • . ' • . . • • . . - . * 
POINT VIII. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE 
WALLS AND ROOFS OF THE SALT LAKE ROAD SHED 
HAD NOT BEEN COiMMENCED BY LEGER NOVEMBER 
22, 1971. 
Roof trusses placed or roof work done: October 
14, 15, 18, 19, 20, and 12. 
Exterior wall block masonry: October 20, 21, 
22, 25, 26, 27, November 8, 9. 
Welding roof steel: November 12. 
'•.".• Roof sheeting: November 15. 
Facia framing: November 16. 
f 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Finding No. 45 (R. 39) provides as. follows: 
A third draw request dated November 22, 1971, on I 
the Salt Lake Road Shed (Ex. 12-D) prepared by Leger re- ' 
ported that 70% of the mechanical work required to be 
done by Roberts had been completed by that date. Work I 
which was required to be done by Leger and which was not I 
dependant upon the completion of the radiant heating pads, 
viz., the walls and roof, had not been completed by the M^ 
thirtieth day of the month. ^| 
Exhibit 12-D was a request for money made by Leger to -
the state of Utah. No testimony was offered to show that the 
figures were meant to show precise project progress. It was I 
merely used as estimates by Leger to obtain periodic draws of 
money from the state of Utah on the project. Yet Leger testi- | 
fied that the plaintiff went ahead and started the structural . 
steel and roofing, and this is supported by the records of the 
resident inspector for the state of Utah (Ex. 48-P) which shows I 
work on the walls and roof on the following dates with the fol-
lowing work performed: I 
% 
XT T~~_ 1 -7 
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POINT IX. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT 
LEGER DID NOT PROVE THE NUMBER OF CALENDAR 
DAYS OF DELAY, IF ANY, CAUSED BY ROBERTS 
ON THE SALT LAKE ROAD SHED. 
Leger proved without dispute that Roberts was requested 
to begin on-site fabrication of the radiant heating pads on 
August 27, 1971, and Roberts admittedly did not start until 
October 8, 1971. Deducting two (2) days pursuant to the con-
tract, a total of forty (40) days are left attributable to 
this portion of the delay. Allowing the defendant a full month 
to complete the fabrication testing and completion of the work 
would bring the completion to November 8, 1971. As has been 
stated before on this very point, the defendants own expert 
testified that it would take 2% to 3 weeks to complete the 
job, and the defendant did not proffer any evidence to the 
contrary. The pads at the Salt Lake Road Shed, however, were 
not completed until December 6, 1971, a period of twenty-nine 
(29) days. This makes a total delay of sixty-nine (69) calendar 
days out of a contract that should have been completed in four 
(4) months. 
The record (Ex. 48-P) shows that there was a final 
inspection at Salt Lake City on May 3, 1972, and other punch 
list items completed on May 17, 1972. A punch list was sent 
by the State of Utah Building Board on May 4, 1972, and a copy 
of the same was sent to Roberts at about the same time (Ex. 
4-P, Tr. 1st day, p. 22). No work was done by Roberts in the 
intervening time (Ex. 48-P and 18-P), and another punch list 
was issued on June 2, 1972, which was mailed to Roberts. This 
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 - ! 
punch list consisted solely of items to be completed by Roberts. A 
However, despite repeated requests, Roberts refused to correct 
the operation of the boiler, requiring Leger to arrange for its 
adjustment on December 13, 1972 and February 15, 1973. The state 
of Utah would not sign the Certificate of Substantial Completion 
until February 22, 1973 (Tr. 2nd day, p. 9 L. 10 to p. 12, L. 10) 
(Ex. 15-P and 16-P), and held Leger's last payment of $11,330.42 I 
until February 26, 1973. 
The Manila job was substantially complete on October 
9, 1972, and because of the failure of the defendant to complete 
his contract, the state held the final payment of $11,330.42 
on the contract until February 26, 1973, a period of 135 calendar I 
days. Adding this figure to the number of days that Roberts 
undisputedly delayed on the installation of the heating pads 
in Salt Lake, a period of 69 days, it is clear that Roberts 
caused a total of 204 days delay in the completion of the con-
tract, which at $50.00 per day amounts to $10,200.00, which 
should have been deducted from Roberts1 contract. It is apparent 
on the record that Roberts caused other delay, such as the gas 
line by deliberately refusing to perform; however, proof of the 
causal relationship is difficult. But there is no dispute, and 
it is clear, that the foregoing days of delay were caused by 
Roberts, and the liquidated damage clause should be enforced. 
See Pearce vs. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2nd 124, 270 P. 2nd 442 (1954). 
4 
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POINT X. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO ROBERTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND ITS 
SURETY. 
Section 14-1-8 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, provides as 
follows: 
Attorney's fees allowed.—In any action brought 
upon either of the bonds provided herein, or against the 
public body failing to obtain the delivery of the payment 
bond, the prevailing party, upon each separate cause of 
action, shall recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
taxed as costs. (Emphasis added) 
The court in this case awarded the defendant attorney's 
fees pursuant to the above statute, not as costs, but as a 
part of the judgment. Rule 54(d)(2) makes provisions as to 
how costs are to be assessed and requires a sworn memorandum 
of costs to be filed. The above statute clearly provides that 
the attorney's fees be taxed as costs. The provisions of Rule 
54 must be satisfied, or the party requesting such costs will 
not be awarded his costs. Walker Bank and Trust Co. vs. New 
York Terminal Warehouse, 10 Utah 2nd 210, 350 P. 2nd 626, 630. 
No mention of attorney's fees is made in the memorandum of costs 
filed by Roberts (R. 42-43); therefore, the award for attorney's 
fees should be stricken from the judgment. 
Furthermore, no finding was made by the court that 
Roberts was a "prevailing party," as set forth in Section 14-1-8 
U.C.A.-. (1953) as amended. There are no Utah cases which decide 
the meaning of the word "prevailing" except as it may relate to 
the award of costs pursuant to Rule 54 U.R.C.P. It is common 
knowledge that the award of attorney's fees always will be an 
amount substantially larger than costs and, as in the instant 
I 
€, 
i 
I 
I 
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case, is a substantial part of the recovery over which parties 
litigate. The Utah Supreme Court has held previously that it was 
not a breach of discretion for a trial court to refuse to award ' 
attorney's fees against an owner of a residence pursuant to 
Section 38-1-18 U. C. A. (1953) as amended, which provides for 
award of attorney's fees to the "successful party," even though 
the court awarded the contractor seeking those attorney's fees 
a judgment of some $43,000.00. Shupe vs. Menlove 18 Utah 2nd 130, 
417 P. 2nd 246 (1966). 
There have been several decided cases in the state 
of Alaska, which construe the words "prevailing party" for the 
purpose of awarding attorney's fees. A leading case in that juris-
diction is Malvo vs. J. C. Penney Co., Alaska 512, P. 2nd 575 
(1973), where the plaintiff sued the defendant for libel and slan-
der. A jury found for the defendant no cause of action, and the 
trial court awarded attorney's fees of $10,504.20. The Alaska 
Supreme Court, after reviewing its adopted rule that the trial 
judge has wide discretion and that the Appellate Court would only 
interfere.with such an award where the award was so manifestly 
unreasonable that an abuse of the trial court's discretion was 
established, reversed the decision as to attorney's fees. The 
court recognized that a cost requirement of a statute, valid on 
its face, could offend due process because it operates to fore-
close a particular party's right to be heard, Boddie vs. Connec-
ticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380, 91 S.Ct. 780, 787, 28 L. Ed. 2nd 113, 
120 (1971), then cited the following passage of Benjamin Cardozo 
as follows: 
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I am not prepared yet to advocate costs that 
would compensate for the expenses of a lawsuit. I have 
seen enough of the judicial process to know its imper-
fections. I would not lay too heavy a burden upon the 
unsuccessful litigant. Some of the losses that are inci-
dental to the establishment of rights and the redress of 
wrongs through the processes of courts should be allowed, 
as a matter of social engineering, to lie where they 
fall. Very likely, heavier burdens should be imposed 
where there is evidence of bad faith or mere dogged 
perversity. (Emphasis added) Benjamin N. Cardozo, 
George S. Hellman, McGraw Hill Pub. Co. (1940) 
The holding of the case was that where a party in 
good faith brings a lawsuit to court for a determination of 
rights and is not guilty of any reprehensible conduct, it is 
an abuse of judicial discretion to penalize such a party by 
awarding the full amount of the prevailing party's attorney!s 
fees.
 ( •'. .'•'. .-
,In the instant case, Roberts claimed the sum of 
$14,172.04 in its counterclaim and cross claim, but recovered 
only the sum of $8,494.95 upon a contract where Roberts and its 
creditors previously had been paid an additional sum of $58,748.87 
r for its work. It is clear from the issues raised by the record 
and in this brief that there were several bona fide disputes 
between the parties that reguired the determination of a court 
to resolve. The decision of the trial court in assessing the 
full amount of defendant's attorney's fees against Leger and its 
surety is manifestly unjust because it reguires that Leger pay 
Roberts1 expenses in fighting a lawsuit that would not have 
occurred had Roberts fully performed and completed his contrac-
tual duties. To even imply that Roberts should be regarded as 
a "prevailing party'1 where the violations of contractual obli-
gations are as numerous and intentional as shown in the record 
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here is a miscarriage of justice, and should not be allowed to 
stand as the law of this jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that 
the findings of the trial court that Roberts was excused from 
performance of its contract because of adverse weather conditions 
and faulty valves; that Roberts did not cause Leger delaiy in the 
completion of the contract; that Leger did not prove fault or 
negligence on the part of Roberts, should be vacated and find-
ings of fact entered that Roberts breached its contract with 
Leger and delayed Leger's completion of the contract a total of 
sixty-nine (69) days without any application for extension of 
time; that Leger is entitled to liquidated damages, pursuant to 
its contract, of $50.00 a day, or the sum of $10,200.00, and 
that sum deducted from the amount awarded Roberts on its cross 
claim would leave a net sum of $1705.05 to be awarded to Leger 
on its complaint. Further, the conclusions of law, judgment and 
amended judgment should be modified accordingly. The order 
granting an amendment of the judgment to the defendant Roberts 
should be reversed, and attorney's fees stricken from the amended 
judgment. .•':,.;-
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